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SUMMARY 
The extent to which the cost of obtaining health care influences the utilisation of GP and other 
health services is a frequently analysed topic. A key issue concerns the extent to which access to 
private health insurance and/or eligibility for free public health services results in differences in 
utilisation that cannot be explained by differences in need factors such as age, gender or health 
status. Ireland is an interesting case study in this regard as only 30 per cent of the population are 
eligible for free GP consultations; the remainder of the population must pay the full price. Using 
panel data from 1995 to 2001 on GP visits in Ireland, this paper applies a random effects approach 
to count data in an attempt to determine the factors influencing GP visiting patterns, with a 
particular focus on the role of eligibility for free public health services.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Despite the fact that hospital expenditure dominates health expenditure in most OECD countries 
[see OECD Health Data (2004)], there is a growing recognition that primary care services have the 
potential to relieve pressure on the hospital sector. In countries such as Ireland where GPs act as 
“gatekeepers” for the use of hospital services, the behaviour of GPs and their patients has 
particularly important implications for resource use in the hospital sector. In this context, it is 
important to understand the factors that influence GP visits and to examine the extent to which 
utilisation is distributed on the basis of need, rather than by ability to pay or other non-need factors 
such as income or area of residence.  
 
The extent to which the cost of obtaining health care influences the utilisation of GP and other 
health services is particularly important in this regard. A key issue concerns the extent to which 
access to private health insurance and/or eligibility for free public health services distort the relative 
prices facing consumers and consequently result in differences in utilisation that cannot be 
explained by differences in age, gender or health status. Across Europe, universal entitlement to 
free or heavily subsidised GP services means that the role of supplementary private health insurance 
in determining utilisation has received most attention [see for example, Buchmueller et al. (2002), 
Cameron et al. (1988), Chiappori et al. (1998), Holly et al. (1998), Hurd and McGarry (1997), 
Jones et al. (2002), Schellhorn (2001), Vera-Hernandez (2001) and Waters (1999)]. In Ireland, the 
focus is not so much on insurance coverage as eligibility for free health services as nearly 30 per 
cent of the population, termed “medical cardholders”, are entitled to free GP consultations and 
effectively face a zero monetary cost in visiting their GP. The remainder of the population however 
must pay out-of-pocket for GP consultations. In addition, while nearly 50 per cent of the population 
are covered by private health insurance, this does not cover the cost of GP consultations (except 
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where large deductibles are exceeded) and is primarily concerned with providing cover for private 
or semi-private hospital care. The medical card system therefore leads to a clear differential in the 
economic incentives facing these two groups (and GPs) and we would expect this to lead to 
significant differences in utilisation, even after controlling for factors such as age, gender and health 
status. Using individual-level data on GP visits, a number of cross-sectional studies find that 
medical cardholders do indeed have a significantly higher number of GP visits than non-medical 
cardholders, even after controlling for a variety of demographic, socio-economic and health status 
characteristics [see Tussing (1985), Nolan (1991, 1993) and Nolan and Nolan (2003)].  
 
The availability of panel data from 1995 to 2001 allows us to improve on the accuracy of previous 
estimates by modelling the relationship between GP utilisation and individual characteristics such 
as age, gender, health status and medical card eligibility at multiple points in time across the survey 
period. Quite apart from the increased sample size, the fact that the same individuals are repeatedly 
observed in a panel data set enables us to control for unobserved heterogeneity across individuals, 
which is impossible using cross-sectional data. Unobserved heterogeneity across individuals is 
represented by factors that are individual-specific but time-invariant, e.g., attitudes/preferences 
towards different types of medical care. However, this necessarily complicates the modelling 
process, as we need to take account of the fact that the random error terms will now be correlated 
across individuals, rather than randomly distributed as in a standard cross-sectional regression 
model. This rules out simply pooling repeated cross-sectional observations. Using detailed panel 
data from 1995 to 2001, the purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants of GP visits, in 
particular to analyse the impact of medical cardholder status on utilisation. 
 
Section 2 below discusses previous research in the area and briefly outlines the Irish system of 
eligibility for free public health services. Section 3 describes the data-set employed in this paper and 
the various dependent and independent variables chosen for analysis. Section 4 discusses the 
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econometric modelling techniques in greater detail while Section 5 presents preliminary estimation 
results. Section 6 concludes and details areas in need of further research. 
2. GP UTILISATION IN IRELAND 
All individuals who are ordinarily resident in Ireland are granted either full or limited eligibility for 
health care services. Individuals with full eligibility, termed “medical cardholders”, are entitled to 
receive all health services free of charge, including GP services, prescribed medicines, all dental, 
ophthalmic and aural services, maternity services, in-patient services in public hospitals and 
specialist treatment in out-patient clinics. The remainder of the population are entitled to free 
maternity services, in-patient services in public hospitals (subject to a charge per day), specialist 
services in out-patient clinics (again, subject to a charge per day) and assistance towards the cost of 
prescribed medicines over a monthly limit. They must, however, pay for all GP consultations and 
all dental, ophthalmic and aural treatments. Currently, approximately 30 per cent of the population 
are medical cardholders [Department of Health and Children (2003)]. Eligibility for a medical card 
is dependent upon income and is decided on the basis of a means test. Since July 2001, all those 
aged 70 years and older are also entitled to a medical card, regardless of income. In special 
circumstances such as a cancer diagnosis, a medical card may be granted to an individual who is 
otherwise ineligible on the basis of income or age.  
 
In terms of the utilisation of GP services, the medical card system therefore leads to a clear 
differential in the economic incentives facing medical cardholders and non-medical cardholders and 
we would expect this to lead to significant differences in utilisation, even after controlling for 
factors such as age, gender and health status. Using cross-sectional individual-level data on GP 
services utilisation in Ireland, Tussing (1985), Nolan (1991, 1993) and Nolan and Nolan (2003) all 
find that medical cardholders have a significantly higher probability of visiting their GP and also a 
significantly higher number of GP visits. In addition, the incentives facing GPs may differ 
depending on the eligibility category of their patients, particularly as reimbursement methods differ 
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between the two categories. GPs are remunerated for their medical card patients on a capitation 
basis, a payment which varies according to the age, sex and geographical location of their patients. 
Non-medical cardholder patients pay on a fee-for-service basis for each visit. GPs therefore have an 
incentive to encourage follow-up visits on the part of their medical cardholder patients and to 
discourage such visits on the part of their non-medical cardholder patients. Prior to 1989, GPs were 
also remunerated on a fee-for-service basis for their medical card patients. In response to the 
findings by Tussing (1985) in favour of demand inducement by GPs under such a system, the basis 
for remuneration was changed to capitation to reduce the incentives for GPs to arrange return visits. 
However, research by Madden et al. (2004) found that the differential in visiting rates between 
medical cardholders and non-medical cardholders did not change significantly after the change in 
reimbursement for medical cardholder patients in 1989. While over 50 per cent of the Irish 
population has private health insurance, it does not cover the cost of GP visits (except where large 
deductibles are exceeded) and is instead primarily taken out by non-medical cardholders to cover 
the cost of semi-private and private hospital cover. As such, insurance cover should not influence 
the utilisation of GP services in Ireland, except to the extent that insurance cover may be a proxy for 
other factors such as risk aversion, attitudes towards health etc. [see also Nolan and Nolan (2003)]. 
  
3. DATA 
We use data from the Living in Ireland Survey, which was carried out by the ESRI and constitutes 
the Irish component of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). The ECHP began in 
1994 and ended in 2001. It involved an annual survey of a representative sample of private 
households and individuals aged 16 years and over in each EU member state, based on a 
standardised questionnaire. In terms of health information, the individual questionnaires contain 
information on health services utilisation in the previous year (GPs, specialists, dentists and 
opticians) and measures of the extent and nature of physical and psychological health problems. As 
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the number of GP visits is not separately identified from the number of visits to medical specialists, 
dentists and opticians in 1994, we confine our analysis to the years 1995 to 2001 inclusive.  
The panel is unbalanced and includes all adults aged 16 years and over, amounting to 42,716 
observations. As Table 1 indicates, there was some attrition in the earlier years, although the 
representativeness of the sample was improved in 2000 with the addition of new households. After 
deleting observations for which information on one or more variables of interest was missing, 
completed observations are available for 36,418 individuals. Table 2 presents variable definitions 
for the various dependent and independent variables employed in this study. The dependent variable 
is a count variable recording the number of visits to a GP in the previous twelve months 
(GPVISITS). As is evident from Table 3, the standard deviation of GPVISITS is consistently larger 
than the mean, a feature of the data which has consequences for the choice of the most appropriate 
econometric methodology (see below). Schellhorn (2001) discusses the problem of reporting error 
that may arise when individuals are asked to recall behaviour over a long period of time. An 
examination of the data shows that there are clusters at certain values (e.g. 10, 12 visits), which are 
consistent with individuals rounding up or down the number of visits or approximating “once a 
month” for example. However, the percentage of individuals with such frequencies is only a small 
fraction of the total and is consequently not considered a problem (approximately two and six per 
cent report 10 and 12 visits per annum respectively).  
 
Summary statistics for the independent variables are presented in Table 4. The demographic/socio-
economic characteristics of the individual are represented by variables describing the age, gender, 
household location, education level, employment status, marital status, household income, medical 
card eligibility and private health insurance status of the individual. As the health status of the 
individual is consistently found to be the most significant factor explaining health services 
utilisation in previous studies, a number of indicators of physical and psychological health status are 
employed. Whether an individual gave birth during the previous twelve months is represented by a 
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dummy variable. Individuals who report that they suffer from “any chronic, physical or mental 
health problem, illness or disability” are subsequently asked for the nature of this illness or 
disability; we have constructed a categorical variable with eleven categories corresponding to 
various medical conditions with the base category indicating that the individual did not indicate that 
they suffered from any chronic, physical or mental health problem, illness or disability. Scores from 
the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ) are used to construct an ordinal variable indicating 
psychological health status. The GHQ contains twelve questions relating to psychological health 
status. For the six positive statements (e.g. “have you recently been able to concentrate on what 
you’re doing?”), a person scores one if they answer “less than usual” or “much less than usual” 
while for the six negative statements (e.g. “have you recently lost much sleep over worry?”), a 
person scores one if they answer “more than usual” or “much more than usual”. These scores are 
added up and result in an ordinal variable indicating the degree of psychological distress; anyone 
scoring above the conventional threshold of two is considered to be in psychological distress.  
 
Jimenez-Martin et al. (2002), Schellhorn et al. (2001), Hakkinen et al. (1996) and Cameron et al. 
(1988) all discuss the problem of using current measures of health status to predict past health 
services utilisation. Table 5 shows that there is some mobility in health status over time; for 
example, over the full panel, 28.3 per cent of those with no health problem in any one year reported 
at least one health problem the following year. An advantage of panel data is that we can use lagged 
values of health status instead, thus removing the potential endogeneity problem associated with 
using current health status to predict past GP visits. We therefore employ lagged values of the 
eleven health status indicators and the GHQ score. 
 
Table 6 presents the average number of GP visits for medical cardholder and non-medical 
cardholder patients. As expected, medical cardholders have a higher number of annual visits to their 
GP than non-medical cardholders, even after controlling for age. This reflects most importantly the 
 9
difference in the relative price of a consultation between the two groups and also the distribution of 
health status across the two groups. Across the period of the panel, the average number of GP visits 
stayed relatively stable for both groups of patient (see Table 3).  It is the objective of the 
multivariate analysis undertaken described in Section 4 below to determine whether there is a 
significant difference between medical cardholders and non-medical cardholders in patterns of 
utilisation, and whether these results are affected by the choice of econometric modelling technique. 
Future work will examine the extent to which transitions into and out of medical cardholder status 
affect GP services utilisation (see also Section 6).  
 
4. ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGIES 
In modelling the determinants of the number of GP visits, the nature of the data on utilisation 
influence the choice of econometric methodology. Count data modelling techniques are necessary 
due to the highly skewed nature of the distribution of GP visits (a large proportion of observations 
are clustered at zero while only a small proportion of individuals record frequent visits) and due to 
the fact that that number of GP visits is a variable that can take on only non-negative, integer 
values. An OLS regression would assume a normally distributed error term as well as predicting 
negative values for the dependent variable. Using a count model overcomes these problems by 
assuming a skewed, discrete distribution and restricting predicted values to non-negative values. 
While the Poisson count data model is the usual starting point for empirical research using count 
data, this distribution assumes that the expected number of counts is equal to the variance (Table 3 
shows how this assumption is violated for our data). As an alternative, the negative binomial count 
data model, which allows the variance of the number of visits to exceed the mean, is commonly 
employed. On the basis of information criteria, the Poisson specification is rejected in favour of the 
negative binomial specification of the models considered below; we therefore concentrate on the 
negative binomial specification. For more detailed derivation and specification of count data models 
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in a cross-sectional modelling context see for example Durkan et al. (1996), Gerdtham (1997), 
Grootendorst (1995), Hakkinen et al. (1996) and Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1995).  
 
Using panel data complicates matters however, as we need to take account of the fact that the 
random error terms may now be correlated across individuals, rather than randomly distributed as in 
a standard cross-sectional regression model. However, the fact that the same individuals are 
repeatedly observed in a panel data set does enable us to control for unobserved heterogeneity 
across individuals, which is impossible using cross-sectional data. Unobserved heterogeneity across 
individuals is represented by factors that are individual-specific but time-invariant, e.g., 
attitudes/preferences towards different types of medical care. Very simply, our model takes the 
form: 
ititiit u'xy ++= βα           (1) 
where ity  represents the utilisation of GP services by individual i  in time period t , iα  is the 
individual-specific term, itx  are the set of explanatory variables such as age and health status and 
itu is the random error term. Much discussion in panel data econometrics focuses on how these 
unobserved individual-specific but time-invariant factors iα  should be modelled. A fixed effects 
formulation for the individual-specific factors assumes that the individual-specific effects are fixed, 
unknown parameters to be estimated within the model. The focus of such a model is on variation 
within individuals, e.g., why individual i’s utilisation of GP services in 1995 is different to 
individual i’s average level of GP utilisation over the period 1995-2001 inclusive. This formulation 
is most appropriate for observations that are “one of a kind” and where the object of the analysis is 
to explain differences within observations. In addition, the number of explanatory variables is 
necessarily reduced due to fact that the within transformation removes all time-invariant variables, 
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e.g. gender, from the model. In practice, fixed effects may only work well when there are many 
observations and much variation within groups.1  
 
The alternative formulation, the random-effects formulation, assumes that the individual effects are 
distributed randomly across the population, i.e.,  
itiitit u'xy +++= αβµ          (2) 
where µ  is the intercept term and iti u+α  is treated as an error term with two components: an 
individual-specific component (that does not vary over time) and a remainder component that varies 
both over time and across individuals. The focus in such a model is on differences both within and 
between, but particularly between individuals, i.e., why individual i’s GP utilisation is different to 
individual j’s GP utilisation. It is more appropriate to consider a random effects formulation for the 
individual-specific effects when the observations are from a large and heterogeneous population. 
For this reason, we proceed with a random effects specification for the individual effects.  
 
Following the approach of Hausman et al. (1984), the random effects negative binomial 
specification may be derived from the Poisson model. The standard Poisson model assumes that the 
dependent variable follows a Poisson distribution where the Poisson parameter ( )δλ ,ugamma~ itit , 
( )β'xexpu itit =  and δ  is the over-dispersion parameter. For the random effects negative binomial 
model, we allow the over-dispersion parameter to vary randomly across individuals, i.e., 
( ) ( )s,rbeta~1 i
i
δ
δ
+  where r  and s  are estimated within the model, along with the coefficient 
vector β . The resulting density function for the random effects negative binomial model, which can 
be used for maximum likelihood estimation, is as follows:  
                                                 
1 However, a fixed effects formulation may make sense if we are interested in explaining variations in GP utilisation at 
an individual level in response to changes in certain circumstances such as medical card eligibility, health status etc. 
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A major disadvantage of the random effects formulation is that it forces the unobserved individual-
specific factors (e.g. previous experience with a GP, attitudes towards medical care) to be 
uncorrelated with the observed independent variables (e.g. age, health status), an assumption that is 
too restrictive in most cases. If this assumption is violated, the random effects estimator is 
inconsistent. The Hausman test is rejected for the standard random effects model (see Table 7) 
meaning that the assumption that the individual effects are not correlated with the explanatory 
variables is violated for our data. One solution is to parameterise the individual-effect, i.e., to allow 
for correlation between the individual effects and the set of time-varying explanatory variables. We 
will implement this modification in a future version of the paper (see also Section 6). 
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
As a preliminary examination of the effect of medical cardholder status, among other 
characteristics, on the utilisation of GP services using panel data, we estimated two specifications of 
the model: a simple pooled negative binomial model and a random effects negative binomial model. 
The results are presented in Table 7. As the likelihood ratio test favours the random effects over the 
pooled specifications of the model, we confine the discussion below to the random effects model. 
Controlling for unobserved individual effects across individuals changes the effects of some of the 
variables; age, rural and income become more significant, while education level becomes less 
significant. While not reported here, the marginal effect on medical cardholder status becomes 
smaller, although it still has a positive and highly significant effect. 
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The various demographic and socio-economic characteristics have results that are consistent with 
expectations. Those aged 65+years visit their GP most frequently in comparison with those aged 
16-24 years, with the effect increasing as age increases. It is interesting to note that age remains 
significant even after medical card eligibility and health status are controlled for, reflecting perhaps 
a greater awareness of good health as age increases. Females visit their GP more frequently than 
males, even when recent maternity experience is taken into account. The results for the education 
level of the individual indicate that, in comparison with those with a primary level education only, 
those with a lower or upper secondary education visit their GP significantly less often while there is 
no significant difference between those with a primary level education and those with a third level 
education. Being either employed or unemployed reduces significantly the number of GP visits in 
comparison with those that are economically inactive, e.g. retired or engaged in home duties. The 
result for the employed is easily justified with reference to the time and effort involved in arranging 
time off work for a visit; the result for the unemployed is more puzzling. Consistent with the view 
that married or separated/divorced individuals are more likely to have children, these groups have a 
significantly higher number of GP visits per annum than single individuals. Once again, it is 
interesting that being widowed exerts a positive and significant effect on GP visits, given that age 
and health status have already been controlled for. As with age and gender, this may indicate that 
our health status variables are not adequately picking up the complex web of health status 
influences on visiting behaviour. However, while our measures may be crude, they are nonetheless 
important to include and add significantly to the explanatory power of the model [see also Tussing 
(1985) and Nolan (1991)]. 
 
Per capita household disposable income exerts a positive and significant effect on the frequency of 
GP visits, despite the fact that those on low incomes are exempt from GP charges through medical 
card eligibility. Gerdtham (1997) also finds that income has an impact on the utilisation of GP 
services and cites this as evidence in favour of horizontal inequity in the utilisation of GP services 
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in Sweden. As expected, the effect of medical card eligibility is highly significant and positive. 
While it is certainly true that the difference in price faced by the two sets of patients explains this 
result, it is possible that medical card eligibility is also picking up other differences in health status 
not accounted for by our measures. Nonetheless, the results show that even after controlling for a 
variety of demographic, socio-economic and health status characteristics, those with medical cards 
have a significantly higher number of GP visits per annum. Interestingly, the effect of having 
private medical insurance significantly increases the frequency of visits, despite the fact that private 
medical insurance in Ireland does not cover the cost of GP visits, except in cases where a large 
deductible is exceeded. The significance of insurance in influencing the number of GP visits may 
reflect differences in attitudes towards health care between the two groups with those covered by 
private medical insurance possibly more risk averse than those without. In common with results 
elsewhere [see for example Jimenez-Martin et al. (2002), Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1995), Hakkinen et 
al. (1996), Gerdtham et al. (1997) and Nolan (1991)], the measures of health status are particularly 
significant in explaining GP services utilisation.  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
As a first step in analysing the determinants of GP services utilisation, with a particular emphasis on 
the role of medical card eligibility in this regard, this paper estimated a simple random effects 
model of GP services utilisation over the period 1995-2001. The availability of panel data allowed 
us to improve on the estimates from previous research using the data in a cross-sectional context 
[see Nolan and Nolan (2003)] through an increased sample size and the ability to control for 
unobserved individual heterogeneity.  
 
Controlling for unobserved individual heterogeneity, medical card eligibility exerts a positive and 
highly significant effect on the frequency of GP visits, even after controlling for additional factors 
such as age, gender and health status. While medical card eligibility may also be picking up subtler 
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differences in health status that our health status measures are not capturing, the results confirm that 
the differences in relative prices faced by medical cardholders and non-medical cardholders are a 
strong determinant of differences in visiting rates. The results also highlight other differences in 
visiting patterns that are not related to need factors such as age, gender or health status. For 
example, those on higher incomes visit their GP more frequently. This presents an interesting area 
for future research, i.e., to determine whether those just above the medical card income threshold 
are being priced out of the market for GP visits.  
 
However, our random effects specification needs refinement in that the Hausman test rejected the 
assumption of no correlation between the individual effects and the explanatory variables; our next 
step is to follow the approach of Mundlak (1978), among others, in parameterising the individual 
effect to overcome this failing. While there are obvious advantages in the ability to exploit the 
increased sample size available in using panel data, to control for unobserved individual 
heterogeneity and to incorporate lagged values of health status, a fourth advantage of panel data lies 
in the opportunity to model dynamic behaviour at an individual level. For example, an individual’s 
number of visits to a GP in one year may depend not only on individual characteristics such as age, 
gender, income and health status, but also on their visiting experience in the previous year. Panel 
data enable us to incorporate this additional information into our models. This necessarily 
complicates the estimation of the models, as we can no longer assume that the individual-specific 
factors are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, irrespective of whether a fixed- or a 
random-effects formulation is chosen for the individual effects. In addition, panel data also allow us 
to model transitions into and out of different states. This is particularly useful in the context of 
medical card eligibility. In addition to refining the random effects specification of our models to 
account for the correlation between the individual effects and the independent variables and 
introducing a dynamic component to the model, our most immediate area of future research will 
involve modelling the effect on GP visiting behaviour of a change in medical card eligibility from 
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one year to the next. In other words, does an individual’s GP services utilisation change 
significantly when they gain/lose a medical card? 
 
 
 
Table 1 Number of Observations 
YEAR NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS COMPLETED OBSERVATIONS 
1995 8,530 7,023 
1996 7,488 5,955 
1997 6,868 5,412 
1998 6,324 4,958 
1999 5,451 4,271 
2000 8,055 3,633 
2001 6,521 5,166 
   
Total  42,716 36,418 
Note:  (i) As a result of the inclusion of new households in 2000 to correct for attrition in earlier years, the number of 
completed observations for 2000 is much smaller than for other years. 
 
Table 2 Variable Definitions for Dependent and Independent Variables  
VARIABLE DEFINITION 
GPVISITS Number of GP visits in the previous twelve months 
  
Age 25-34 
Age 35-44 
Age 45-54 
Age 55-64 
Age 65+ 
=1 if aged 25-34 years, =0 otherwise 
=1 if aged 35-44 years, =0 otherwise 
=1 if aged 45-54 years, =0 otherwise 
=1 if aged 55-64 years, =0 otherwise 
=1 if aged 65+ years, =0 otherwise 
(Base Category = aged 16-24 years) 
  
Female =1 if female, =0 otherwise 
(Base Category = male) 
  
Rural =1 if lives in household located in open country or in a village with 200 - 1,499 
inhabitants, =0 otherwise 
(Base Category = lives in a household located in a town with 1,500 – 10,000 or more 
inhabitants or in Waterford, Galway, Limerick and Cork cities or Dublin city and county) 
  
Lower Secondary =1 if highest level of education completed is lower secondary (i.e., intermediate/junior 
certificate), =0 otherwise 
Upper Secondary =1 if highest level of education completed is upper secondary (i.e., leaving certificate), =0 
otherwise 
Third Level =1 if highest level of education completed is third level (i.e., diploma, primary degree or 
higher degree), =0 otherwise 
(Base Category = highest level of education completed is primary level) 
  
Married =1 if married, =0 otherwise 
Separated/Divorced =1 if separated or divorced, =0 otherwise 
Widow =1 if widowed, =0 otherwise 
(Base Category = never married) 
  
Employed =1 if employed, =0 otherwise 
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Unemployed =1 if unemployed or seeking employment, =0 otherwise 
 (Base Category = economically inactive (i.e., in education, engaged in home duties, 
retired, incapacitated for work etc.) 
  
Income Net Household Weekly Income in IR£2 (adjusted for household size, inflation and divided 
by 100) 
  
Medical Card =1 if have a medical card or covered on another family member’s card, =0 otherwise 
(Base Category = does not have a medical card and is not covered on another family 
member’s card) 
Table 2 continued 
VARIABLE DEFINITION 
Insurance =1 if insured either in own name or through another family member, =0 otherwise 
(Base Category = not insured in own name or through another family member) 
  
Diseaset-1 =1 if nature of illness or disability is an infectious or parasitic disease or neoplasm or 
congenital abnormality, =0 otherwise 
Systemt-1 =1 if nature of illness or disability is an endocrine disorder, blood disorder, skin disorder 
or a genito-urinary problem, =0 otherwise 
Mentalt-1 =1 if nature of illness or disability is a mental disorder, depression (defined in 2000 only) 
or a mental handicap (defined in 2000 only), =0 otherwise 
Nervoust-1 =1 if nature of illness or disability is a nervous complaint or bad nerves, =0 otherwise 
Circulatoryt-1 =1 if nature of illness or disability is a circulatory problem, =0 otherwise 
Respiratoryt-1 =1 if nature of illness or disability is a respiratory problem, =0 otherwise 
Digestivet-1 =1 if nature of illness or disability is a digestive problem, =0 otherwise 
Headachet-1 =1 if nature of illness or disability is headaches, =0 otherwise 
Musculo-Skeletalt-1 =1 if nature of illness or disability is a musculo-skeletal disorder, bad back or a physical 
handicap (defined in 2000 only), =0 otherwise 
Accidentt-1 =1 if nature of illness or disability is an accident, =0 otherwise 
Othert-1 =1 if nature of illness or disability is not specified or does not fall under the above 
classifications, =0 otherwise 
(Base Category = does not have any major illness, physical disability or infirmity that has 
troubled the individual for the past year and is likely to go on troubling the individual in 
the future (1987 definition) or does not have a chronic physical or mental health problem, 
illness or disability (1995 and 2000 definition)) 
  
GHQt-1 Generalised Health Questionnaire Score (ranges from 1 to 12; see text for details) 
Note: (i) Household income is equivalised using the following scale: 1 for the HOH, 0.66 for any other adults over 
the age of 14 years and 0.33 for any children under the age of 14 years. 
 
Table 3 Summary Statistics for Dependent Variable (GPVISITS) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 All 
Mean 3.4 3.3 3.5 3.5 3.7 3.5 3.8 3.5 
Standard Deviation 5.9 5.5 5.3 5.5 6.8 5.1 7.9 6.1 
Minimum 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Maximum 100 100 80 90 212 70 250 250 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 The euro was introduced in Ireland on 1 January 2002. 
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Table 4 Summary Statistics for Independent Variables  
VARIABLE PERCENTAGE OF SAMPLE IN EACH CATEGORY 
Age 16-24 15.3 
Age 25-34 16.2 
Age 35-44 18.6 
Age 45-54 17.6 
Age 55-64 14.2 
Age 65+ 18.1 
  
Female 53.0 
Male 47.0 
  
Rural 51.5 
Urban 48.5 
  
Primary 34.0 
Lower Secondary 22.9 
Upper Secondary 28.6 
Third Level 14.5 
  
Employed 51.3 
Unemployed 4.6 
Economically Inactive 44.1 
  
Married 60.5 
Separated/Divorced 2.3 
Widowed 7.5 
Single 29.7 
  
Income 1.81 (1.23) 
  
Medical Card 32.3 
No Medical Card 67.7 
  
Insurance 43.1 
No Insurance 56.9 
  
Birth 1.5 
No Birth 98.5 
  
Disease 0.6 
System 1.7 
Mental 1.0 
Nervous 1.3 
Circulatory 3.8 
Respiratory 2.5 
Digestive 0.9 
Headache 0.2 
Musculo-Skeletal 4.9 
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Accident  0.6 
Other 0.9 
No Health Problem(s) 81.6 
  
GHQ 1.20 (2.36) 
Note: (i) For Income and GHQ, the statistics are the sample mean and standard deviation (in parentheses). 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 Transition Matrices for Health Status Variables 
VARIABLE 0 1 
At least one health problem   
0 92.4 7.6 
1 28.3 71.7 
   
Stress (i.e., GHQ score >=2)   
0 89.8 10.2 
1 56.5 43.5 
Note:  (i) The matrices are interpreted as follows: 92.4 per cent of individuals with no health problem in any one year 
also reported no health problem in the following year, while 7.6 per cent reported at least one health problem in the 
following year.  
 
Table 6 Average Number of GP Visits by Age and Medical Cardholder Status 
AGE MEDICAL CARDHOLDERS NON-MEDICAL CARDHOLDERS 
Age 16-24 3.4 1.6 
Age 25-34 5.0 2.4 
Age 35-44 4.8 2.2 
Age 45-54 5.7 2.2 
Age 55-64 6.4 2.8 
Age 65+ 7.4 3.5 
   
All 6.0 2.3 
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Table 7 Estimated Coefficients for Pooled Negative Binomial and Random Effects 
Negative Binomial Models 
 POOLED RANDOM EFFECTS 
Age 25-34 0.11 
(0.05)** 
0.10 
(0.03)** 
   
Age 35-44 0.05 
 (0.05) 
0.12 
(0.03)*** 
   
Age 45-54 0.04 
(0.05) 
0.19 
(0.03)*** 
   
Age 55-64 0.17 
(0.05)*** 
0.37 
(0.04)*** 
   
Age 65+ 0.33 
(0.06)*** 
0.60 
(0.04)*** 
   
Female 0.25 
(0.02)*** 
0.27 
(0.02)*** 
   
Rural -0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
   
Lower Secondary -0.17 
(0.03)*** 
-0.10 
(0.02)*** 
    
Upper Secondary -0.16 
(0.04)*** 
-0.08 
(0.02)*** 
   
Third Level -0.15 
(0.04)*** 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
   
Employed -0.19 
(0.03)*** 
-0.18 
(0.02)*** 
   
Unemployed -0.11 
(0.05)** 
-0.11 
(0.03)*** 
   
Married 0.12 
(0.03)*** 
0.06 
(0.02)** 
   
Separated/Divorced 0.16 
(0.07)** 
0.12 
(0.05)** 
   
Widowed 0.10 
(0.04)** 
0.12 
(0.04)*** 
   
Income 0.02 
(0.01)** 
0.03 
(0.01)*** 
 21
   
Medical Card 0.57 
(0.03)*** 
0.46 
(0.02)*** 
   
Insurance 0.06 
(0.03)** 
0.10 
(0.02)*** 
Notes:  (i) Standard errors, which for the pooled negative binomial model are adjusted for the clustering of 
observations by household, are reported in parentheses. 
 (ii) *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
 22
Table 7 continued 
 POOLED RANDOM EFFECTS  
Birth 1.18 
(0.04)*** 
1.00 
(0.03)*** 
   
Disease 0.76 
(0.09)*** 
0.33 
(0.05)*** 
   
System 0.82 
(0.06)*** 
0.36 
(0.03)*** 
   
Mental 0.75 
(0.08)*** 
0.23 
(0.05)*** 
   
Nervous 0.72 
(0.06)*** 
0.29 
(0.04)*** 
   
Circulatory 0.74 
(0.04)*** 
0.32 
(0.02)*** 
   
Respiratory 0.75 
(0.06)*** 
0.33 
(0.03)*** 
   
Digestive 0.79 
(0.08)*** 
0.34 
(0.05)*** 
   
Headache 0.35 
(0.12)*** 
0.15 
(0.11) 
   
Musculo-Skeletal 0.67 
(0.04)*** 
0.27 
(0.02)*** 
   
Accident 0.91 
(0.09)*** 
0.38 
(0.06)*** 
   
Other 0.59 
(0.12)*** 
0.19 
(0.05)*** 
   
GHQ 0.05 
(0.003)*** 
0.02 
(0.002)*** 
   α  0.99 
(0.02)*** 
 
r  3.62 
(0.08)*** 
s  3.55 
(0.10)*** 
Year Dummies? YES YES 
Number of Observations 36,418 36,418 
Log-Likelihood -80,469.88 -76,724.71 
Hausman Test  1607.74 
Rejected 
Notes:  (i) Standard errors, which for the pooled negative binomial model are adjusted for the clustering of 
observations by household, are reported in parentheses. 
 (ii) *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
(iii) The likelihood ratio test of the pooled vs. the random effects models always rejects the pooled 
specification. 
(iv) The one-percent chi-squared critical value for 37 degrees of freedom is 59.89. 
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